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Bjørn Hallsson has recently (2019) raised an epistemological puzzle which is born out of 
real-world political disagreement.  The puzzle, in a nutshell, is this: These days, when 
people form political beliefs they (unbeknownst to themselves) employ motivated 
cognition.  This is ‘cognition that aims at arriving at an interpretation of evidence that 
yields a desired conclusion . . . [rather than] accurate beliefs’ (2019: 2190).  Moreover, the 
greater a person’s epistemic abilities (e.g. intelligence and familiarity with evidence), the 
more powerful his motivated cognition.  That is, the greater a person’s epistemic abilities, 
the more easily and convincingly he can justify his desired conclusion to himself and 
generate stories about why contrary evidence ought to be ignored.   
What, then, to make of political disputes from the point-of-view of the 
epistemology of disagreement?  On the one hand, we typically think that epistemic ability 
in an interlocutor gives us reason to downgrade our beliefs upon discovering that we 
disagree.  On the other hand, if epistemic ability travels with motivated cognition—and 
                                                        
1 I thank Bjørn Hallsson and Kirun Sankaran for helpful comments on this paper.  I am 
also grateful to Desmos, Inc., which kindly granted permission to use Figure 1, which was 
generated with its graphing calculator (URL = <https://www.desmos.com/calculator>, 
retrieved 14 July 2019). 
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in the political domain, it does—then we have reason to discount that interlocutor’s 
opinion.  How should we resolve this tension? 
Hallsson leaves that question unanswered.  He regards it as ‘a genuine puzzle with 
unwelcome consequences whichever route we go’ (2019: 2200).  He is content to raise the 
worry and then, ably, turn aside objections (e.g. that political disagreement is not 
epistemologically significant in the first place). 
 I want to suggest a solution to Hallsson’s puzzle.  Namely: The tension is resolved 
when we adopt a Bayesian approach to belief revision (as I discuss, more generally, in my 
Forthcoming).  As we shall see, this falls on the side of ignoring interlocutors’ opinions 
when their motivated cognition is bad enough.  No matter how epistemically able they 
be, their disagreement should not influence our beliefs.  The reason this is so, I argue, is 
that these interlocutors provide us with no new information on which to conditionalize.  
Because of the extreme partisanship and motivated cognition which Hallsson cites, we 
implicitly and to high accuracy know partisans’ political beliefs before they are ever 
revealed to us.  When we discover that we disagree, we learn nothing new. 
 
1.  Hallsson’s argument, in brief 
Hallsson begins by distinguishing two ‘notions of epistemic peerhood’—that is, two 
methods of assessing a person’s epistemic credentials:2 
ABILITY: An individual’s familiarity with the relevant evidence and arguments, 
and their epistemic virtues such as intelligence, thoughtfulness, and freedom from 
bias. 
 
                                                        
2 On these two notions, see, respectively, Kelly 2005 and Elga 2007. 
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ACCURACY: The probability of an individual’s belief about p being correct, 
conditional on their disagreement with another individual. (2019: 2190, my 
emphasis) 
 
We normally think that these two go hand-in-hand.  If not coextensive, we at least 
expect them to be highly correlated.  But by surveying the empirical literature on political 
belief formation, Hallsson shows how the two may come apart not only in theory but in 
practice.  That is, he shows how a high-ABILITY epistemic interlocutor may have low 
ACCURACY, and vice versa.  Hallsson presents the following scenarios: 
BRILLIANT PARTISAN: I belong firmly on one side of the political aisle.  I have a 
doxastic attitude toward a politically disputed proposition p that is typical for 
those on my side of the aisle.  I learn that BP is an extremely intelligent, highly 
educated and scientifically literate, open-minded, and reflective person on the 
other side of the political aisle, who is intimately familiar with the relevant 
evidence about p. 
 
MEDIOCRE PARTISAN: I belong firmly on one side of the political aisle.  I have a 
doxastic attitude toward a politically disputed proposition p that is typical for 
those on my side of the aisle.  I learn that MP is a moderately intelligent, decently 
educated and scientifically literate, somewhat open-minded, and reasonably 
reflective person from the other side of the political aisle, who has some familiarity 
with the relevant evidence. (2019: 2191-2192, my emphasis) 
 
BP is, ex hypothesi, high-ABILITY.  But she is, Hallsson points out, low-ACCURACY—
since no matter what the evidence about p actually entails, BP will construe it to support 
her desired conclusion, via motivated cognition.3  It is precisely BP’s epistemic gifts that 
enable her to generate a justification for what she wants to believe politically—even in 
the face of shoddy or inconclusive evidence—and to generate clever reasons why contrary 
evidence should be ignored. 
                                                        
3 This is the justification for BP’s having low ACCURACY which Hallsson finally settles on 
(2019: 2194).  He considers other possibilities earlier in the section. 
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MP is lower-ABILITY than BP but higher-ACCURACY.  Why?  Because, being less 
epistemically able than BP, MP is not as effective at interpreting the evidence in a way 
that confirms his existing beliefs.  As a result, MP’s ‘belief about p is more constrained by 
what the evidence actually supports than BP’s belief is’ (2019: 2194, my emphasis). 
 
2.  The Bayesian response 
Interesting in its own right, Hallsson’s paper is valuable because it provides further reason 
to believe that a Bayesian approach to disagreement-based belief revision—which is a 
minority one, at least among epistemologists—is correct.4 
 I first summarize the Bayesian approach.  We are interested in the truth or falsity 
of some proposition p:5 abortion is morally impermissible; humans are causing climate 
change; that is the Dean walking on the quad (Feldman 2007); and so on. 
We have a prior probability, Pr(p) Î (0, 1), which is our degree of belief in p before 
discovering the existence of disagreement.  This is also referred to as our ‘credence’ or our 
‘confidence’ in p.  Thus, if p is humans are causing climate change, Pr(p) = 0.8 means that 
we believe, subjectively, that there is an 80% chance that humans are causing climate 
change.  This is all intuitive, and standard in the disagreement literature. 
 The Bayesian approach to disagreement differs from its competitors, steadfast and 
conciliatory, in three ways:   
                                                        
4 See Easwaran et al. 2016, Isaacs 2019, Jehle and Fitelson 2009, Lasonen-Aarnio 2013, 
Levinstein 2015, Mulligan Forthcoming, and Shogenji Manuscript. 
 
5 The Bayesian approach, in its full generality, allows for p to take on three, four, or more 
discrete values (rather than just true and false), or even be treated as continuous. 
 5 
Bayesian Principle No. 1 
When we Bayesians learn that someone disagrees with us about p, we treat that as just 
another datum on which we can update our beliefs.  It is no different, as a category 
matter, from the data we obtain when we read some new empirical study.  In contrast, 
the standard (if implicit) understanding in the epistemological literature is that there is 
something special about human judgment, such that dissent must be treated via a unique 
epistemic framework. 
 In particular, many ‘traditional’ (i.e. non-Bayesian) epistemologists of 
disagreement, like David Christensen (2007), regard disagreement as evidence that one 
has made a mistake.  For these epistemologists, when we learn that an epistemic peer 
disagrees with us, we learn that we may have evaluated the evidence incorrectly, and, 
thus, that our existing credence is not the ideally rational one. 
 Although I do not wish to explore the differences between the traditional view of 
disagreement and the Bayesian view in detail, a few remarks are in order.  First, for the 
traditionalists, disagreement implies that we may have evaluated the evidence 
incorrectly—not that we did.  There are plenty of cases of disagreement in which we, and 
not our interlocutor, evaluated the evidence correctly yet belief revision is still rational.6   
                                                        
6 For example, in Christensen’s (2007) ‘Restaurant Tip’ case, two friends go out to dinner 
and calculate their shares of the bill.  They are epistemic peers (i.e. equally good at math, 
they both took a careful look at the check, etc.), but they come to different conclusions 
about what their shares are.  Suppose that EP1 is right and EP2 is wrong.  The 
traditionalist surely holds that EP1 should lose confidence in his belief, despite, ex 
hypothesi, being right.  (And I agree that he should.)  It is the (internalist) possibility of 
error that demands epistemic compromise.  
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But this is hardly news.  For every belief we have (at least as far as paradigmatic 
cases in the literature go) we know, or should know, that we could have erred.  We all 
make mistakes, all the time. 
 Perhaps disagreement indicates that it’s more likely that we erred than we 
suspected pre-disagreement.  That raises the question, ‘what’s so special about 
disagreement?’  There are many ways we might learn that it’s more likely that we made an 
error than we thought.  Suppose, for example, that we think that a tax cut is good for the 
general welfare.  One way we could learn that we may have evaluated the evidence 
relevant to this claim incorrectly is via disagreement.  Another way is by learning a new 
piece of microeconomic theory.  It is unclear why the former must be treated in a special 
way, as the traditionalists desire. 
Second, relatedly, the Bayesian approach handles this dynamic of possible prior 
mistake.  Yes, we might update our beliefs after reading a new empirical study because 
that study provides us with new evidence.  But the study might just as easily suggest to us 
that we made an error in our reasoning.  (The study might, e.g., claim that an inference 
from x to y is invalid, while our current belief is based in part on x à y.) 
Third, there are many cases of actual disagreement in which we should revise our 
beliefs because our interlocutor is bringing us new first-order evidence.  Suppose I think 
it’s going to rain because I see that the barometer is falling.  My neighbor tells me that he 
thinks it’s not going to rain, because he just looked at the weather radar and saw no 
precipitation.  We disagree about the proposition it’s going to rain and I so revise my 
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belief accordingly.  In this case, the reason why I revise my belief is because disagreement 
provided me with new evidence relevant to the proposition. 
Now here the traditionalist objects: This is not a genuine case of disagreement, 
because there is no epistemic peerhood relation.  After all, my neighbor and I do not 
share the same evidence. 
And that’s true.  And perhaps, for that reason, the case is not philosophically 
interesting.  But it illuminates a critical advantage of the Bayesian approach: its 
generality.  Whether some disagreement provides us with new first-order evidence, or 
suggests that we made a mistake in reasoning somewhere along the way, or raises the 
possibility that we are biased, is not the important thing.  What is important is our 
assessment of our interlocutor(s) by specifying appropriate likelihood functions (see 
below).   
Along similar lines, Bayesianism does not limit itself to special cases of 
disagreement, whereas traditionalists almost always consider disagreement with one 
epistemic peer.  Multiple interlocutors (see n. 12) and epistemic superiors/inferiors are 
naturally accommodated by Bayesian belief revision.   
Real-world disagreement is so rich and complicated.  I believe that Bayesianism 
captures that richness and the traditional approach does not. 
 
Bayesian Principle No. 2 
We treat our interlocutor’s opinion about p—let’s call it q—as a random variable, the 
value of which she reveals to us (generally, in conversation). 
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Bayesian Principle No. 3 




Pr(𝑝) × Pr(𝑞|𝑝) + Pr(~𝑝) × Pr(𝑞|~𝑝)
(2.1) 
 
Because Pr(p) is known, and Pr(~p) = 1 – Pr(p), the ‘only’ hurdle to arriving at a rigorous 
posterior probability Pr(p|q) is specification of the likelihoods Pr(q|p) and Pr(q|~p).  That 
is, we must specify the probabilities that our interlocutor would have the opinion that she 
does, q, given that p and given that ~p, respectively. 
Let us apply the Bayesian approach to Hallsson’s puzzle.  For the moment we 
consider the simplified case in which q is binary; the interlocutor thinks that humans are 
causing climate change, or she does not.  (That is, our interlocutor does not provide a 
credence in p, but only ‘yes; p’ or ‘no, it’s not the case that p’.)  Suppose Pr(p) = 0.8, as 
above, and my interlocutor, a BRILLIANT PARTISAN (who is a conservative, let’s say), 
tells me, ‘I believe that humans are not causing climate change’. 
 By design of Hallsson’s thought experiment, BP’s view is unconnected to the 
evidence.  Because of her political beliefs and her powerful motivated cognition, BP is 
going to believe that humans are not causing climate change no matter the evidence.  
‘BP’s brilliance means that, more or less regardless of what the evidence really supports 
about p, he or she would be able [to] construe the evidence as supportive, and to conjure 
                                                        
7 I am going to abuse notation a little from here on out, using q to refer to both a random 
variable and its realization. 
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up reasons to be supremely confident that his or her desired conclusion about p is 
correct.’ (2019: 2194, my emphasis). 
 As a result, specification of the likelihoods is easy.  The probability that q, given 
that humans are not causing climate change, is 1.  If we are not causing climate change, 
BP is certainly going to say that we are not causing climate change.  But the probability 
that q, given that humans are causing climate change, is also 1!  BP’s motivated cognition 
ensures this.  When it comes to climate change, the state of the world is just not relevant 
to BP’s belief. 




0.8 × 1 + 0.2 × 1 = 0.8
(2.2) 
  
We see that BP’s opinion should not sway us.  To use Hallsson’s term, ACCURACY is what 
matters. 
 What about MEDIOCRE PARTISAN?  Here it is less certain that q is divorced from 
the evidence: ‘MP does not have the ABILITY necessary to escape from the conclusion 
that the evidence really warrants decreasing his or her confidence in his or her favored 
conclusion about p.’ (2019: 2194, my emphasis). 
 Therefore, we specify likelihoods that accommodate the potential ‘failure’ of MP’s 
motivated cognition.  If the evidence supports human impact on the climate, MP might 
not reach his desired, conservative conclusion.  Unlike BP, MP cannot wholly wriggle his 
way free from the facts. 
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So while Pr(q|~p) might remain 1, if humans are causing climate change there is a 
possibility that MP will believe that it is happening.  That is, Pr(q|p) ¹ 1. 




0.8 × 0.7 + 0.2 × 1 = 0.74
(2.3) 
  
With MP, we do not maintain our original belief in p, as was the case for our interaction 
with BP.  Here, we mitigate our belief slightly.  The reason is that MP’s dissent is 
informative.  He is more sensitive to the evidence than BP is (BP is not sensitive at all), 
and so his negative judgment about human-created climate change is epistemically useful 
to us.  Now, Pr(q|p) = 0.7 was chosen arbitrarily.  The important point is that the more 
sensitive an interlocutor gets, the more we ought to reduce our confidence in p upon 
learning that we disagree. 
Note that here, too, ACCURACY controls.  MP’s ABILITY is only relevant insofar as 
it improves or degrades the precision of his judgments. 
There is another way to interpret these results from the Bayesian point-of-view. 
Notice that, perhaps counterintuitively, we do not gain new information when we learn 
that we disagree with BP about p.  We knew prior to learning that fact that BP was, well, a 
brilliant partisan.  And we also knew what that entailed: that her motivated cognition 
would cause her to settle on a certain belief no matter the evidence.  We thus were able to 
predict, if implicitly, what BP’s opinion about p was before she revealed it.   
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As Hallsson himself points out, ‘the greater a person’s ABILITY, the more 
predictive that person’s political ideology is of their beliefs about politically charged 
propositions’ and ‘beliefs [are] polarized along political fault lines, such that political 
ideology is highly predictive of one’s belief about these propositions’ (2019: 2191).  Put 
differently, BP’s views on climate change were already fully baked into our prior, Pr(p), 
and so her disagreement was not informative.8  
 We have, then, a preliminary resolution to Hallsson’s puzzle.  A proper application 
of Bayes’s Law aligns with revising our beliefs in accordance with our interlocutors’ 
ACCURACY—not their ABILITY.  Indeed, it is precisely that ABILITY, and its bad effect 
on our interlocutors’ sensitivity to the evidence, that should cause us to ignore their 
opinions.  Of course, this is perfectly compatible with ABILITY being a virtue in most 
circumstances.  In any real-world scenario, motivated cognition would not be the sole 
modelling consideration.  But it is, ceteris paribus, a bad thing. 
 There is a technical issue to address.  It is standard in the epistemological 
literature, and for good reason, that our interlocutor report not a binary judgment about 
p (i.e. as true or false), but a continuous credence q Î (0, 1).  That is, our interlocutors 
report a probability for the uncertain event p.   
                                                        
8 These considerations are related to Hallsson’s discussion of ‘clustering’ on pp. 2197-2198 
(see also Elga 2007).  But here we are not denying that political disagreements are 
epistemically significant.  Nor are we begging the question by claiming that because some 
interlocutor is wrong about related disagreements, she is wrong about this one, too.  
What matters is the predictive nature of political partisanship—what an interlocutor’s 
opinions about related issues suggest for her opinion about this one. 
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In principle nothing changes from the approach just described—we simply model 
q as a continuous random variable (probably but not necessarily distributed Normal 
truncated to (0, 1)) and specify appropriate likelihoods. 
 In practice, though, this can be onerous.  The likelihoods must incorporate 
ABILITY—no easy thing to reckon on its own, especially when we include the motivated 
cognition dynamic—plus bias in its various forms, the possibility of interdependence 
between our judgment and our interlocutor’s judgment, and myriad other epistemic 
considerations.  (Plus we may struggle, conceptually, to specify distributions which are 
conditioned on an event which has not and may never occur.) 
 In order to operationalize this Bayesian approach, decision theorists have 
introduced a variety of models, each of which seeks to simplify the likelihood 
specification problem without losing necessary generality.9  Here I wish to apply my 
favorite, which is due to Christian Genest and Mark Schervish (1985), to Hallsson’s puzzle.  
I shall first give the model and then discuss the assumptions and philosophy behind it: 
 
Pr(𝑝|𝑞) = Pr(𝑝) + 𝜆(𝑞 − 𝜇) (2.4) 
  
The prior probability Pr(p) is, again, our pre-disagreement belief in p = humans are 
causing climate change.  Now, however, q is a credence—it is our interlocutor’s expressed 
belief about the probability that p.  So we are now in the case commonly considered in 
                                                        
9 Summaries of these models may be found in Clemen and Winkler 1990 and 1999, and in 
French 1985. 
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the epistemological literature, in which we are trying to decide whether to modify our 
confidence (and if so, how much) upon learning an interlocutor’s confidence.  The 
parameter l I shall describe shortly. 
 The parameter µ is the mean of the distribution of q, as we see it.  That is, we think 
about our interlocutor, and what she might say about p, and build up a probability 
density in our own mind (although this is not strictly necessary—see below).  This could 
happen before learning q (ideally) or after.  For example, in the case of BP, we will say 
that low values of q are more likely than high values.  We are quite sure that BP, being a 
committed conservative, will assign a low probability to the event p (i.e. that humans are 
causing climate change).  Perhaps we also think that q should be distributed normally.  
Those are modelling choices; what is important is that the distribution integrate to 1 and 
have support (0, 1). 
 For example, we might model q thus: 
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To reiterate, this distribution represents our judgment about what BP thinks about p.  We 
are almost certain that she will say that humans are not causing climate change (i.e. q < 
0.5).  Indeed, we are quite sure that will she report a confidence close to q = 0.1 (‘there is a 
10% chance that humans are causing climate change’), which is the modal value of our 
chosen distribution.10  
 Here is the key point: When BP (or anyone else, for that matter) reports what we 
expect her to—that is, when µ = q—equation (2.4) reduces to Pr(p|q) = Pr(p).  In such 
                                                        
10 Because the support of this distribution is (0, 1), is no longer technically Normal.  
Therefore, its mean is no longer (generally) equal to its mode.  Figure 1 is, rather, a 








 = 0.13, where j(x) is the probability density function of the Standard 
Normal distribution, and F(x) its cumulative distribution function. 
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cases, we do not change our belief in p as a result of disagreement, no matter our 
interlocutor’s ABILITY.  Again, this is the Bayesian intuition: If we don’t gain new data as 
a result of an interaction, we ought not change our beliefs.  Similarly, when our vegan 
organic farmer friend tells us that he believes that humans are causing climate change, 
that should not affect us. 
 Suppose, however, that BP surprises us.  Suppose that this conservative, small 
government, free market supporter says, ‘I’ve taken a look at the evidence, and I think 
that there is a 60% chance that humans are causing climate change’ (i.e. q = 0.6).  Now 
this is interesting.  The fact that someone with conservative commitments has reached 
such a conclusion, perhaps overcoming powerful motivated cognition along the way, 
provides us reason to increase our confidence in p.  (Here’s another intuition: If and when 
conservatives come en masse to believe that humans are causing climate change, we can 
be pretty sure it’s happening.) 
Plugging those values into equation (2.4), we get: 
 
Pr(𝑝|𝑞) = 0.8 + 𝜆(0.6 − 0.13) (2.5) 
  
To reach a final, revised belief, we must address the parameter l.  Although a technical 
discussion of this is outside of the scope of this paper (see Genest and Schervish 1985 and 
West and Crosse 1992), a few useful things can be said. 
 First, l must comport with consistency conditions which ensure, inter alia, that 0 £ 




𝜇 − 1 ,
Pr(𝑝) − 1








For the values under discussion, Pr(p) = 0.8 and µ = 0.13, we have -0.92 £ l £ 0.23.   
Second, many relevant epistemic considerations can be incorporated into our 
belief revision through careful selection of l.  These include ABILITY per se (which 
increases l), motivated cognition (which decreases l), other forms of bias (which 
decrease l), and, in the case of multiple interlocutors, dependence between them (which 
decreases the ls). 
Third, the consistency conditions maintain coherence between our reckoning of 
our interlocutor’s reliability, l; what we expect her to say, µ; and our prior probability of 
p.  It would not make sense, for example, to believe both that (i) some event k is highly 
improbable and (ii) this person who has great insight into k is going to say that k is highly 
probable.  The consistency conditions prohibit such oddities. 
Suppose that we select l = 0.15,11 which comports with the consistency conditions.   
Then, by equation (2.5), we can compute our updated confidence in p when our 
BRILLIANT PARTISAN surprises us with a confidence q = 0.6.  Namely, Pr(p|q) = 0.87.  
When we find out that a committed conservative believes, if only modestly, that humans 
are causing climate change, we increase our confidence that it is the case. 
                                                        
11 Here is how I selected this value.  Observe that we can use equation (2.4) to work 
backwards, computing l by specifying a posterior probability for some given value of q.  I 
might think, thus, that my posterior probability of p ought to be 0.9 in the event that my 
interlocutor ends up agreeing with me, Pr(p) = q = 0.8.  That yields l = 0.15.  In many 
cases, it may be easiest to compute l by choosing a value for q very close to 0 or 1. 
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 In the case of a MEDIOCRE PARTISAN who reports q = 0.6, we might expect a 
more modest increase in confidence, given MP’s lesser ABILITY and our expectation, pre-
disagreement, that he will have a view on climate change closer to our own.  We can see 
that if we take l = 0.1 and µ = 0.2, we increase our confidence to Pr(p|q) = 0.84 upon 
interacting with him. 
 We ought to give careful thought to the unique epistemic features of any given 
case of disagreement and incorporate them into a Bayesian updating procedure.  Note 
that in the above analysis we did more than was necessary.  There was no need to specify 
the whole distribution of q, as we did in Figure 1.  All that we must do is answer, ‘what do 
I expect my interlocutor to say?’ (i.e. ‘what is µ?’) 
 I shall leave things there, since I think these considerations suffice to solve 
Hallsson’s puzzle.  If any interlocutor—brilliant, mediocre; liberal, conservative—reports 
exactly what we expect them to—that is, if q = µ—we ought not modify our confidence in 
the proposition at issue.  When this is not the case—and it often is not—we ought to use 
Bayes’s Law, with situation-appropriate likelihood functions, to determine our new 
confidence.  When equation (2.4) is appropriate, we think about the epistemic features of 
the case at hand—ABILITY, motivated cognition, bias, dependence, and all the rest—
select values for µ and l, and arrive at our posterior.  Although I do not have the space to 
explore things here, I note that this approach has the benefit of incorporating further 
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generality.  For example, and as alluded to above, the Bayesian approach can easily 
accommodate disagreement with multiple interlocutors.12 
 Hallsson’s paper commends, if indirectly, a Bayesian approach to disagreement.  
Hallsson is right to worry that standard approaches to disagreement in the 
epistemological literature, steadfast and conciliatory, are unable to cope with scenarios 
like those he gives.  The lesson is not to give up hope, but to look elsewhere for our 
solution. 
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